




The Ian Jew month. have proved tIKU tM Anglo-American powerll have, to
their own tktriment, tremendotUly underrated 'M fighting power oj Japan, tM
8tnngtA 01 Mr morak and her amu all weU all tM ability oj her military kade1'lIhip.
TIKU which Wall underra'ed mOlI4 and thereJore caUlled the ",-eeuut lIenlItJlion in the
courH oj tM war up to now wall the air arm of the JapaneH Navy. From tM firn
mommI, wMn the war brolce out over Pearl Harbor, and throughout the Jollowing
monthlI, it hall won a long row oj lItACCUlIU which were deva8tating to the fighting
power and the prutige oj the AUiu. I' ill an irony of laU that it Wall Great Britain
and 'M United Statu themlIelWll who, above aU during the Wallhington OonJermu
in 1922, drow Japan to 'hill development.
We have alIbd WilJ&elm ScAulu, tleluan joumalillt and Tokyo COfTupandellt
of the "Deu.UcM Allgemeine ~ilung," to wriU the following arlich on tM origin
a'id growth of 1M Japanen naval air arm.-K.M.
W HEN ONDecember 8, 1941, togeth-er with the news of the outbreak
of the War of Greater East Asia,
the first reports about the Japanese vic-
tory in Hawaii were sent out over the
ether, many readers may for a moment
have doubted the correctness of these
reports. The deed was so bold, the
success so great, that there were no pre-
vious examples to which one could have
compared the event. The last doubts,
however, were removed through a repeti·
tion of this victory, the devastating blow
against the British warships Prince oj
Walu and Repu18e two days later, and
through the admission of the British de-
feat by Churchill. Since then scores of
individual actions as well as a number of
great Japanese victories over the Ameri-
can-British-Dutch fleets have again and
again shown the world the overwhelming
strength of the Japanese naval airmen.
In them Japan possesses a weapon which
will not only deeply influence but may
even decide the outcome of the war.
EARLY BEGINNINGS
The bearer of these sensational succes-
ses, the Japanese Naval Air Force, recently
celebrated the thirtieth year of its exist-
ence. It was founded in 1912, one year
after the Army Air Force, by two Japa-
nese officers who had returned from
lengthy studies in France and America.
They established the first Navy flying
school at Oppama, near the naval port of
YOk08uka. It was not considered very
important at the time, as can be seen
by the fact that in ten years' work it
received barely six million yen in funds.
It was not paid serious attention until
1922, when a British air mission, headed
by Captain Senville, was summoned to
Japan to reorganize training methods.
Not until 1927 did the Navy Ministry
create a department for "Naval Flying,"
which then, however, took determined
charge of the development.
This development was dictated to the
Japanese Navy heads by the British and
Americans at the Washington Conference
in 1922 through the ill-famed 5:5:3 stip-
ulation. In limiting the Japanese battle-
ship force to three fifths of those of
England and America, they forced the
Japanese to turn their attention to un-
limited defense possibilities in other
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spheres, as, for instance, that of naval air-
planes. The development was hastened
by the fact that two battle cruisers
under construction, the Akagi and Amagi,
could, by agreement with England and
America and following their example, be
converted into airplane earners. Instead
of the Amagi, which was destroyed in the
great earthquake of 1923 before comple-
tion, the battleship Kaga was later con-
verted into an airplane carrier. The
Akagi, completed in 1927, the Kaga,
placed in service in 1928, and an older
and smaller aircraft carrier, the Bosko,
formed the nucleus of the Japanese naval
air ann, which has now made such a
sensational appearance in the Greater
East Asia War.
THEY TOOK A QHANOE
It should be emphasized here that,
according to recent statemente made by
responsible admirals, the leaders of the
Japanese Navy were soon to recognize
the possibility of overcoming the in-
feriority in numbers and tonnage as com-
pared with the British and Americans by
better material, superior training, and the
utmost concentration on unlimited weap-
ons. All expert commente since Hawaii
reveal unequivocally that, since the Wash-
ington Naval Agreement, the training
of the Japanese naval fliers has been
undertaken with a determination and
severity which indicate that the Japanese
naval heads were aware of holding a
trump card. Other naval leaders could
still discuss the relative merits of battle-
ships and aircraft. For the Japanese
naval leaders it was enough to see a
possibility for the superiority of aircraft
to direct their main attention towards
this possibility. Of course, the general
public did not hear anything of these
considerations. At international discus-
sions, Japan gave not the slightest indica-
tion that she conceded the naval air
arm a good chance in the fight against
naval vessels. To all outward appear-
ances Japan continued, like all other naval
powers, to place battleships, cruisers, and
submarines in the foreground.
As an example of the severity of the
training of Japanese naval airmen, it
was recently reported that, after they
had received their basic training, they
were only rarely given an opportunity to
take oft in good weather. In a press
interview, one of the fathers of Japanese
naval aviation, Rear Admiral Matsunaga,
gave an account of how severe this train-
ing really was, emphasizing that only
through a most intensive training lasting
twenty years could the achievements of
the last six months be won. According
to him the training is as follows.
BEARDLESS YOUTHS
Japanese naval fliers are all recruited
from volunteers, who must not be less
than fifteen or more than seventeen years
old on entering the service. So when
Matsunaga speaks of the flying heroes,
he tenderly uses the expression "beardless
youths," indicating by this that the ac-
tive pilots of Japanese naval aircraft are
all little over twenty years old. The first
three years of their schooling are devoted
to technical matters like navigation, in-
struments, knowledge of motors, "and
general theory of flight. Not until the
fourth year do they start actual flight
training. In the fifth year they learn
stunt and night flying, in the sixth land-
ings, and in the seve~th starting from
airplane carriers. Only at the end of the
eighth year does the flying pupil become
a full pilot.
Matsunaga recounted that in 1921,
when the first aircraft carrier was placed
in service, there was only a single Japa-
nese pilot who was able to make a smooth
landing on deck, and that it cost eight
thou8and attempts to make two more
pilots absolutely sure. He told of the
difficulties in taking oft with a full bomb
load from the short runway of a carrier,
and added with a shrug that not a few
flying pupils lose their lives before they
pass their final tests. In this connection
he formulated the classic sentence that in
the first year of their training the recruits
are filled with the ardent desire to die
for their country (which, with the Japa-
nese attitude towards life and death,
must be taken literally), but that in the
second and following" years they are
gradually and firmly educated not to die
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until they have destroyed the enemy.
One result of this training is the willing-
ness of Japanese naval fliers to destroy
themselves if they are sure of thereby
destroying the enemy.
THE EQUIPMENT
This training is the first pillar of the
Japanese successes in war; the equipment
placed in the hands of trained pilots rep-
resents the second pillar. The Army
Air Force and the Naval AirForce, found-
ed separately, have also developed their
machines quite separately. Of course,
there has always been a general exchange
of experience. In the very beginning
both branches had to depend on foreign
models. But with its entirely different
requirements, Japan's aviation as a whole
has moved away from foreign patterns
and followed its own paths, just as her
Army aviation has diverged from her
Navy aviation. Today a purely Japanese
development is to be found in both
branches, and the traces of former co-
operation with other countries on the
basis of license agreements have dis-
appeared almost entirely. The events of
the last few months have shown what a
high standard the Japanese planes have
reached.
In spite of frequent descriptions and
photographs published in the Japanese
press with the permission of the Japanese
Navy, a secret surrounds the important
details of the types of aircraft used by the
Japanese Naval Air Force. It should be
remembered that one of the reasons for the
~apanese successes was that all important
information had been kept secret. The
same strict secrecy is warranted regarding
the inner organization of the Japanese
Naval Air Force. Japanese public year-
books indicate that the Naval Air Force
is divided up into a number of air regi-
ments, which are combined into air corps
and air brigades. But since the outbreak
of the China conflict and the abrogation
()f the British and American naval trea-
ties, no details have been published about
the number of these regiments, brigades,
and corps or about the number of planes
belonging to each formation.
UNKNOWN LEADERS
Of course, the same is true also of the
command of the Naval Air Force, where the
Japanese do not even publish the names
of leading personalities. The careers
of leading admirals, as far as they
have been published in Who's Who, reveal
that every superior naval officer, every
fleet commander, has at one time been
connected with the Naval Air Force, has
shared the responsibility for its training,
and is himself trained to lead it. At the
present time we must limit ourselves to
the statement that the coastal air forma-
tions, equipped mainly with land planes, are
placed under the command of the various
naval stations, while those attached
to the fleet are under the command
of the respective fleet commanders.
Therefore the victories of the Japanese
Naval Air Force in Hawaii and at Kuan-
tan have been credited directly to Admiral
Yamamoto, the Commander in Chief of
the combined Japanese fleets. Inciden-
tally, Admiral Yamamoto, who was the
first training officer of the Japanese Naval
Air Force, also has a just claim to be
called its father.
The influence of geography on warfare
is particularly apparent in the air arm.
For Germany, enclosed by the narrow
North Sea and Baltic Sea, airplane car-
riers were not only forbidden at first but
also impracticable, since they would have
been too easily exposed to enemy bomb-
ing attacks and too limited in their field
of action. Japan did not have to con-
sider such things in building her fleet.
Her geographical position and the vast-
ness of her possible future battlefield
pointed logically to exploiting the idea of
airplane carriers. Therefore Japan, ac-
cording to the Japanese Far East Year-
book 1941 (page 106), possessed six aircraft
carriers of altogether approximately
90,000 tons and five seaplane tenders.
During the last few months the world
has been learning with amazement how
these ships and the planes belonging to
them have been able to influence the war
situation in the Pacific after the danger of
American and British battleships had been
banished through their first daring attacks.
